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BOOK REVIEW
God the Father Almighty: A Contemporary Exploration of the Divine Attributes,
by Millard J. Erickson (Grand Rapids, Michigan: Baker Book House, 1998.
303 pp.) ISBN 0-8010-1154-X. $26.99.

REVIEWED BY EDWARD N. MARTIN, PH.D.
Associate Editor of the Global Journal of Classical Theology
Dean of Philosophy, Apologetics and History
Trinity College & Seminary
Newburgh, Indiana 47629
In this book Millard Erickson tackles some of the most difficult and key issues in philosophical
clarity and explanatory legerdemain. He presents a well-constructed coverage of the topics
discussed and a surprisingly methodical explanation of some difficult concepts, views, and
terms. While Erickson does tend to rely heavily upon the leaders in the field–the likes of Alvin
Plantinga, Thomas V. Morris, Norman Kretzmann, William Hasker, Richard Swinburne, and a
long list of others, he does weigh and evaluate the various texts of these individuals with fairness
in light of his goal: to lay out a comprehensive idea of God that is amenable to the criticallyminded contemporary evangelical systematic or philosophical theologian. Much of the work that
needs to be done for the advanced undergraduate or graduate student is to translate and
understand the leading literature in the field of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion.
Erickson has done a good job at providing such a translation and understanding.
A basic precis of the book might read something like this: Erickson provides a classic
investigation of the metaphysical attributes of God, especially as these divine characteristics
relate to the created order, showing the need for the evangelical scholar to steer between an
excessively Thomistic and an excessively process theological view of God. What is interesting in
this approach is the undeniably Thomistic methodology that imbues much of Erickson’s fine
analysis of God’s attributes, especially in how we are to conceptualize or imagine what the
divine attributes are ‘really’ like or how we are to comprehend them. We cannot get around the
need for analogical thinking in the area of properly considering what God’s nature and properties
might actually be ‘like,’ and the method of via analogiae comes to the forefront in this analysis,
as it rightfully should. Thomas would be quite satisfied with Erickson’s preference for and use of
this method [1]; however, Aquinas would be eager to respond to some of Erickson’s reasons for
being quite careful and dubious of the Thomistic conceptions of some of the attributes of God,
classically conceived (as in the Summa Contra Gentiles and the Summa Theologica).
At first, I confess being skeptical of Erickson’s overall project in this book, wondering why such
a book was really needed, in light of three excellent somewhat similar books that have appeared
in recent years, viz. Stephen Davis’s Logic and the Nature of God (1983, Eerdmans), Ronald
Nash’s The Concept of God (Zondervan, 1984), and Thomas V. Morris’s Our Idea of God
(InterVarsity/Notre Dame, 1991). Morris’s book, which is referred to regularly in Erickson’s
text, itself makes a point of departing from the classical views of eternity, simplicity and allied
metaphysical characteristics of God as seen in both Aquinas and Anselm. However, there seem

to be enough salient differences between these texts and Erickson’s text to warrant the
recommendation, usefulness and intrinsic value of Erickson’s text at this time.
First I shall speak of the text’s helpful layout; then the unique endeavors and contributions it
makes; and finally some criticisms of the text.
I. FORMAT
The layout of the text, covering four main sections, includes an introduction, challenges to the
traditional understanding of God, the attributes of God, and a conclusion. This layout
communicates clearly to the reader that there are some very nontraditional approaches to God
presently being touted and bandied about, no part of which ought to be confused with a
considered conservative view of God. Erickson is seeking, as is Nash, Morris, and Davis, to steer
between the two lurking enemies that have haunted classical theology since its inception,
namely, the Scylla of pure being theology, and the Charybdis of pure becoming theology.
The developed, or at least considered, evangelical intuition is that Aquinas is a scholar who can
both enlighten our philosophical theology and frighten with his overpowering Grecian form of
pure being theology. "Use his clever and ingenious methods and distinctions, but be very careful
of the results!" seems to be the feeling of many evangelical scholars. Some, like Norman Geisler,
being trained for the advanced degree at a Catholic institution, may wonder whether my
characterization is too strong. It may be that there are more ‘peeping Thomists’ around than we
think, and why not? Aquinas looms large as an absolute watershed in the history of Christian
thought as a theoretician in excelsis. But it is still proper to ask if there is too much of an ongoing influence in Christian theology of Greek metaphysics, for example, in our intuitions about
substance, essential and accidental properties, actuality and potentiality, and allied topics.
(Concepts all of which are, I might add, so nearly necessary to our current day analytical
philosophical theology that it would be hard to imagine the latter without the use of the former.)
Because of the history of ideas, and the undeniable, unchangeable influence of Socratic, Platonic
and Aristotelian philosophy upon Christian theology, this question will continuously have to be
asked; it will not go away, because our language, our thought patterns, our definitions of key
philosophical concepts are and will probably always be significantly influenced by the thinkers
who formed part of the birth of Western philosophy.[2]
I would submit, however, that most scholars in our camp try consciously to steer clear of the
concept of God that is traditionally found in writers like Aquinas, since the feeling one comes
away with after reading the Summa Contra Gentiles is that God is not a person but an
impersonal, at once a kinetic akinnesis (showing a sort of incomprehensible infinite energy but
having no real relation to temporal change possibly to move), unmoveable, religiouslyunavailable deity. After the fashion anachronistically of Spinoza, Aquinas spins out the
implications of his atemporally eternal God, leading him at one point to conclude that
[i]n God however there is no real relation to creatures, but a relation according to reason only, in
so far as creatures are referred to him.[3]

God according to this view can enter into no real relations with his creatures; it is at once a
disturbing if theologically fecund idea.
The swing of the pendulum to the opposite extreme from Aquinas takes us to the process view of
God where God is so religiously available that he is too much like us, ultimately lacking
transcendence and the omnicompetent properties (such as omnipotence and omniscience) as
fondly found in Aquinas’s idea of the almighty God.
Nash, Morris, Davis, and now Erickson wish to steer us between this impending Scylla and
opposing Charybdis by synthesizing the classical view of God as found in Aquinas with the
commonsense notions that there can be analyses of knowledge, causal input, power, being,
simplicity, goodness, and outside influences wherein God is maximally perfect, religiously
available to his people (the latter being made in his image), and also wonderfully the creator,
sustainer, and sovereign Lord who redeems his people through his son Jesus Christ.
To achieve this end, of laying out a way between a pure being and a pure becoming theology,
Erickson stresses the importance (a la Grenz and Olson in InterVarsity Press’s 20th Century
Theology [4]) of God’s being both transcendent and immanent in some sense: above his creation
in some relevant ways, while also being within his creation, in other salient ways (again notice
the center-stage positioning of Aquinas’s analogical thinking). Of course, theologians have often
referred to these two terms as a sort of deus ex machina: a way to explain what seems
intrinsically unexplainable, or a way to say something, as Augustine reminds us in De Trinitate,
so as not to be silent. Traditional theists know that the transcendence of God and the immanence
of God have to play a key role in the final account of how God can be both maximally perfect
and also available to his people who pray and call out to this God. The question has always been
how exactly to characterize this relationship between these two aspects of the divine being,
without falling into an undesirable account of any of the individual properties traditionally
attributed to God. Also, another live question that philosophical theologians have had to deal
with is how much to say about each of the individual properties of God, and about the
conjunctions of the properties, or how the properties relate one to another.
In essence, Erickson’s solution is to look at the traditional concepts of God’s omniscience,
omnipotence, sovereignty, eternality, and omnipresence with a "both/and" eye: God both
possesses, in some sense, the traditional set of ‘omni’ properties, eternality, simplicity, and
sovereignty, but must possess these characteristics in a way that is beyond or that transcends our
basic notions of these properties.
Of course, being a trained philosopher himself (having taken, as we discover in a footnote on
p.226, the M.A. degree in Philosophy at the University of Chicago in 1958), Erickson wants to
carry out his examination in such a way as to determine that the traditionally-named ‘old’
metaphysical property names of God such as eternality, aspatiality, acorporeality, and the like
can preserve our evangelical hermeneutical intuitions about God in his being and as related to the
world, as seen in Scripture while tendering a sufficiently robust view so that God remains the
ultimate being, the maximally great being, the one than which none greater can even be
conceived.

It is also important to note the format of most of the individual chapters. The outline of the
chapter on Divine Eternity will again help us here. The subtitles in this chapter, with page
numbers (to weigh proportion given to each idea/concept), include:
Biblical Data (p. 114)
The Issue (p. 115)
The Atemporalist View (p. 117)
The Temporalist View (p. 124)
The Biblical Concept of Eternity (p. 128)
The Position of Cullman: Eternity as Extended Time (p. 128)
James Barr’s Criticism (p. 130)
A Mediating Position: Relative "Timelessness" or "True Temporality" (p. 131)
A Synthetic Position (pp. 134-140)
Erickson’s synthetic conclusions can be seen to ‘synthesize’ the data reviewed and criticized not
only to steer between pure being and pure becoming theology, but also between mere
philosophical or rational reflections on what God’s properties might be like and the data of
Scripture. Again, this point is similar to Morris and others who have written in this genre, but
Erickson does take more time, and is keenly aware, of what the Scriptures report concerning
(what appears often to be) the ‘real’ properties or characteristics of God (as opposed to
something merely metaphorical or anthropomorphic).
II. UNIQUE FEATURES
One of the unique features of the book is the willingness and riskiness to propose new
terminology that is argued to be needed to express some meaning that should be included in a
given concept but seems not to be. Often new terms show up when Erickson is trying, via the via
analogiae to form some slightly different concept by which we might picture God’s relationship
to time, or space, or governance, or knowledge, or the like. A good example of this tendency can
be found in Erickson’s helpful discussion of God’s eternity. You will not find large sections of
text here, again, that score high on originality; the keen review and assessment of the current
writers in the field make up a great percentage of the text. However, at various junctures
Erickson does a good service to suggest insights that repay our efforts to grasp them. For
example, at the end of chapter 6 on God and eternity, Erickson ends with this point:
It would probably be desirable to formulate some new terminology for these aspects of God’s
relationship to time. The adjective "atemporal" is negative in orientation. If we followed the
pattern of the other attributes of God, we would speak of him as ‘omnitemporal,’ although the
idea of omnitemporality may be contained within the concept of omniscience. And to capture the
idea that time, at least thought of as cosmic time, does not limit God, we might speak of him as
being ‘supertemporal.’ (p. 140)
Erickson here shows that we have perhaps expended all of the linguistic and etymological
support of some of the words associated with God’s properties, classically portrayed, and that
after sufficient criticism and extension of the terms by scholars over the last forty or so years, the
old terms either have perhaps finally run their course or are in need of some timely auxiliary

concepts. As above, there are several instances in the book in which the author attempts to point
to new directions where our conceptualization of some specific attribute of God may wish to go
in the future. It is at these points (after extended summarization and critique, which is usually
quite incisive but fair) that Erickson, though terse, is at his creative best indicating where some
future philosophical theological developments might focus.
III. CRITICISMS: SOME REFLECTIONS
Erickson’s book does read a bit colloquially at most points, which is in some ways a welcome
relief from the sometimes nearly incomprehensible articles found on similar topics in the
professional journals (say) Nous and Review of Metaphysics. Still, the book smacks of having
been written too quickly. Ambiguously referring demonstratives pepper various sections and
cause some consternation; some phrases not-so-well formed crying out for explanation or
clarification interrupt otherwise pellucid discussions. It would be overly tedious to present each
of these passages, so perhaps a short example will suffice. Consider for example the sense
conveyed in this text:
[Concerning theodicy, the classical theist has an upper edge over, e.g. the free will theist.] For
God, who knows all things and all possibilities, deemed even the consequences he would
experience, including the death of his Son, to be worth the total benefit. (p. 288-89)
The question that Erickson generates here is, "the total benefit when achieved and for whom?"
The author offers no clarification here. However, it is clear that Erickson here aligns himself
with the traditional ‘greater-good theodicy’ in the classical camp. Admittedly our own camp
could be more unified and clear in our thinking on this particular point regarding the ‘greater
good defense.’ (No better a treatment can be found than Keith Yandell’s "The Greater Good
Defense," in Sophia [Australian journal of contemporary philosophy of religion] 13 (1974): 314.) At any rate, I found this passage (and a few similar to it) to be unclear, but to contain
nothing that could not be cleared up and explained had more simply been written to avoid
meaning or referential ambiguity or underdetermination (in which the data provided concerning
some point in the text is not sufficient to warrant a particular statement or conclusion).
Again, there are virtues in this sort of quasi-colloquial presentation: technical terms are used
sparingly; the audience (advanced undergraduate or beginning graduate students are probably in
view) is likely to track with the models of explanation that are copiously sprinkled throughout
the text, and especially numerous in the chapter on the transcendence and immanence of God
(chap. 12); and allied positive benefits of simplicity and comprehensiveness accrue without the
technicalia. However, for those trained in philosophical theology with such writers as Thomas
Morris, William Rowe, Alvin Plantinga, Phillip Quinn, William Hasker, Keith Yandell, William
Wainwright, and other leading figures, the book will not satisfy the philosophical theologian who
is a purist at heart. Such readers would find happier hunting grounds in the works mentioned
previously by Stephen Davis, Thomas Morris and Ronald Nash.
In reading this book, I found that the last chapter on practical implications of the doctrine of God
seemed quite inviting, and so I actually read it first. I would recommend the same for most
readers, since proceeding in this fashion offers a summary of the most important conclusions

drawn in the main text, laying out the strengths and some weaknesses (that are really quite
livable in comparison to the opposing views) of the considered classical (and now updated
Evangelical) conception of Deity.
IV. CONCLUSION
It is the last two chapters that put a nice capstone on Erickson’s text and warrant finally a
satisfactory review. The titles for these two chapters here indicate their purpose well: "God’s
Immanence and Transcendence" [chap. 12], and "The Practical Implications of the Doctrine of
God" [chap. 13]. These sections again are a synthetic attempt to show how the doctrines of
transcendence and immanence must play a role in the resolution of our views of the divine
attributes. Also, they show the wonderful theoretical explanatory strength–by way of practical
implications of the doctrine of God–that is inherent in the Christian theistic view of God and his
created order. A scripture index and a general index are supplied at the end of the book.
Erickson’s book is in one way extremely patient and measured, in another way in need of at least
one extra chapter. On the one hand, he slowly looks at what he takes to be many of the leading
theorists (mostly philosophers, but as we saw above in mentioning Cullman (obviously his Christ
and Time is in view, above)) regarding some property or position. Only after fairly assessing
each position does Erickson offer his ‘synthetic’ position. The extra chapter should be added in a
specific, patient, and measured view of the meta-issue that Erickson touches on at some points
explicitly (e.g., p. 283), but merely presupposes to be in place in the rest: the issue (as above) of
analogical predication. I believe the book would be not insignificantly improved if there was a
specific chapter devoted to how the Evangelical is justifiedly to think about God’s essence,
nature, personhood, and attributes in a fashion that is analogical to our attributing same-named
properties or states to other possible or actual beings. With respect to the personhood of God,
Erickson does say something extremely helpful, albeit terse. He writes in his discussion of divine
simplicity:
God is a unitary being. Sometimes one gets the conceptions that the nature of God is a bundle of
attributes, somewhat loosely tied together: God, however, is not an attribute or a predicate. He is
a living person, a subject. Perhaps what we need is a new metaphysic of persons. Much of the
discussion has been carried on in terms of a substance metaphysic, in which reality is a substance
possessing certain attributes. A better way of thinking may be to conceive of reality as
fundamentally personal rather than impersonal. Thus, God is a subject, a person–and a very
complex person at that. (p. 231)
I believe a rich field of inquiry lies in this general area of a person-based metaphysic, and think
that Erickson has nicely stated the sort of insight that needs to be part of a chapter justifying
some of the methodological issues that need to be decided on and justified up front in such a
study.
Our talk of God’s goodness or knowledge, and of his being a person, assuredly are to be taken in
some sort of analogical fashion. Our considered analogical predication theory, I think, has to be
roughly equivalent in structure and context to Aquinas’s doctrine of analogy. I submit, in
conclusion, then, that Erickson would do well to provide this missing justification and treatment

of this important methodological meta-issue (that of predication of terms of God) in such a book.
Providing this missing feature would enhance the book’s value, and help the student to
appreciate more readily the practical implications of God’s relations (both actual and possible) to
us and his world. So, perhaps Erickson’s use of the analogy doctrine needs to be examined and
justified to be of value, or more value, to the contemporary members of our camp. Even if the
unjustified analogical predication doctrine is a bit of unacknowledged borrowed Thomistic
capital, still Erickson has treated us to a fine survey of contemporary analyses of our idea of
God.
**********
FOOTNOTES
[1] See Aquinas’s Summa Contra Gentiles, bk. 1, chap. 34 for discussion of analogical
predication.
[2] Obviously there are the Pre-Socratic philosophers who were not unfamiliar with philosophy
of religion themselves (cf. Hesiod’s Theogony). However, so as to start somewhere, a good place
is Socrates and his pupil and pupil’s pupil.
[3] Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologica, vol. 19 in Great Books of the Western World, Ed.
Robert Maynard Hutchins, trans. Fathers of the English Dominican Province, Chicago:
Encyclopedia Britannica, 1952; Q. 13, Art. 7, respondeo, p. 69. The name of this article is,
"Whether Names Which Imply Relation to Creatures are Predicated of God Temporally?"
[4] See Stanley J. Grenz and Roger E. Olson, 20th Century Theology (InterVarsity Press, 1992).

